@Aliaksei
VOTE tokens were designed to perform the elections of DAO Council. I think there are two ways forward:
- Implement elections of DAO Council members as it was planned. Even with the above proposal this makes sense for at least for some period of time.
- Discard VOTE tokens and perform DAO Council management based on their internal procedures (votes for adding or excluding members) + polls of veAURORA holders. In the long run, in case VE model for Community treasury would work as expected, it makes sense to allocate the whole Aurora DAO Council treasury holding to Community treasury. In such a case, Council will become yet another participant in the ecosystem and won’t have any special treatment. This would be just another set of people that would work for the ecosystem. They would need to get the funding from the community treasury.
@Aurobot99
From my exploration and analysis of the blockchain ecosystems, I can clearly state several things.
First, the shorter the period for a user is from an action to a tangible result, the more engagement you can expect from this user. This supports the narratives around expected airdrops and VE models of other projects. In case of $CRV people are locking tokens and distribute the rewards to themselves. What can be simpler than that? 
. A piece that adds to the engagement is the ability for a person to make an educated personalised decision. In case of $CRV, this is the period of lock.
In the current model (Aurora DAO Council holds the treasury, it gets elected once a year) the engagement from the people is required only once a year. This means that the connection path between the user and his influence on the treasury management is very long. Thus, he won’t feel that he’s in charge of anything. An outcome of this understanding was the initial proposal of having a Community Treasury, where users would be able to directly influence the distribution of the funds and thus the direction of the development of Aurora ecosystem.
This proposal changes nothing in the approach chosen. VE model for the Community Treasury is just a specification of how it should work. While VOTE tokens were designed to handle the elections of the DAO Council and represent a non-direct influence on the ecosystem.
VOTE future
I think the future of $VOTE tokens is a point of additional discussions and it was intentionally not in this post. This proposal is about the token economy and implementation of the Community Treasury mechanics. It is not about the Council procedures.
From the technical side, election smart contract is developed and audited. It can be used at any time. There’s no front end for it though. The thing that is lacking is clear guidelines on how the elections should be handled and process around it that would prevent a misuse of power of the new elected Councils and dishonest elections. An attempt to describe it in the further decentralisation of governance post was gaining quite some valuable feedback that should be analysed and incorporated. It clearly shows that there are many points of view on the election process and things are not quite simple.
Honestly, I’ve never seen the proper implementation of elections in blockchain ecosystems. And I’m sure that it’s going to be something quite complicated to organise in general, not saying about being organised by Aurora Labs–the small-size blockchain development company. Aurora Labs doesn’t have the resources nor the expertise to handle all of the aspects of elections. Unfortunately within the last year no other participant of the ecosystem was offering their help with it. So I really encourage community to pay attention to this and jointly work on this problem.
An option to consider may be the delay of the elections. The implementation of working Community Treasury would presumably get engagement from the users. Performing the elections of the Council afterwards is exactly what’s needed for the proper democratic voting with a representative result.